Education Level of Constituencies, Accountability, and Presidential Impeachment Voting in New Democracies:
Evidence from the Philippine House of Representatives*

LEE Jeongwoo**

Abstract

This paper investigates how legislators vote to presidential impeachment cases in new democracies under the pork-dominant system where party-line voting is rarely observed and politicians strive to deliver pork and patronage to constituents instead of national public policies. The president in the Philippines controls over pork and patronage network; hence it is difficult for legislators to check and balance the power of the president. Nevertheless, some legislators continuously file the impeachment process and vote to impeach the president, even though their defeat is evident. In this situation, do they vote according to the

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I. Introduction

Can legislators in the Philippines balance and check power of the president? Can they vote to impeach the president? The president in the Philippines possesses huge power over pork and patronage, and politicians strive to deliver pork and patronage to constituents instead of national public policies (Kim 2006: 302) and therefore legislators tend to pass a bill suggested by the president with a unanimous or near-unanimous vote (Shin 2018). Upon this background, it seems that legislators cannot take a position to impeach the president if they demand pork and patronage network.

As it is demonstrated in <Table 1>, legislators, however, vote to impeach the president in regardless of their party affiliation. About 16 percent of governing-party legislators also voted to impeach the president. According to the procedure of presidential impeachment in the 13th Congress, a threshold for initiation of presidential impeachment in the Philippines is low, the one-third of legislators in accountability of their constituencies, or loyalty to the president? With two cases of presidential impeachment vis-a-vis Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in the Philippines, this paper finds that legislators vote to impeach the president according to the education level of constituencies in regardless of their party affiliation. This finding indicates that voter demands can affect the impeachment voting in new democracies such as the Philippines.

Key Words: Accountability, Legislative Behavior, Pork-dominant System, The Philippines, Presidential Impeachment, Voter Demands
the House. The trial begins if one-third of members of the House submit a file for impeachment to the Senate. The House also can vote when the dismissal of the impeachment is recommended. The dismissal also requires one-third votes of members in the House to override the impeachment process (Republic of the Philippines House of Representatives 2005). Threshold on both submission and dismissal of presidential impeachment is low, hence defeat of legislators is evident if there is the overwhelming number of legislators who are with the president.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Affiliation</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Number of legislators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Party (N=156)</td>
<td>To Impeach</td>
<td>25 (16.02%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not to Impeach</td>
<td>131 (83.97%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Parties (N=51)</td>
<td>To Impeach</td>
<td>25 (49%)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not to Impeach</td>
<td>26 (50.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of cases except for abstention</td>
<td>207</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Presidential party refers to Koalisyon ng Kataotan at Karansan sa Kinabukasan (Coalition of Truth and Experience for Tomorrow) including Lakas - Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD), with a coalition of Liberal Party (LP), a faction of Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC), and smaller parties such as Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (Kampi) (Teehankee 2006: 235).

Nevertheless, legislators suggest and vote to impeach the president in the parliament consistently. The goal of this paper is to explore why some legislators vote to impeach the president in the Philippines even though their defeat is evident. Although the Filipino president controls over pork pipeline, legislators confront two options for their
presidential impeachment voting: (1) to impeach the president for accountability vis-a-vis their constituencies, or (2) not to impeach the president according to the loyalty to her. Will they vote to impeach the president for their constituencies or the president?

According to studies on legislative voting behavior in new democracies such as the Philippines, legislators demonstrate different behavior according to their party affiliation. Governing-party legislators are likely to vote to pass a bill for the president, whereas opposition legislators are less likely to vote for the president if they are from a more developed region where constituencies demand programmed policies rather than pork and patronage (Shin 2018). Yet, this paper shows a different aspect when legislators vote to impeach the president.

This paper argues that legislators vote to impeach the president according to the rate of constituencies received higher education. People with higher education are more likely to be aware of the corruption of politicians and hence they will urge their legislators to impeach the president when the impeachment trial is in process. There were three cases of presidential impeachment vis-a-vis the president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in 2005, 2006, and 2008. This paper finds that legislators vote to impeach the president according to the education level of constituencies in regardless of their party affiliation. This finding indicates that voter demands can affect the impeachment voting in the Philippines and suggests that this argument can be further explored with other cases of new democracies.

I utilize a database by Shin (2018) on impeachment cases in 2005 and 2006. This paper can be further developed if the data of 2008
is available. With a method of probit regression analysis, empirical findings of this paper are presented. Furthermore, I expect that this study can apply its analysis on impeachment voting to the current president Rodrigo Duterte. He recently saved his political life from an impeachment case (New York Times 2017/03/16). If data on his impeachment trial is available as well, this study can be further explored.

This paper proceeds as follows. The following section presents literature review for this paper. Section 3 provides backgrounds of presidential impeachment cases in the Philippines and section 4 is for hypotheses on how legislators vote for the president in case of impeachment in the Philippines. Section 5 describes the data, statistical model, and measures for empirical results. Section 6 demonstrates the results of the empirical test, and discussion on the empirical test follows in section 7. Section 8 concludes.

II. Literature Review

Literature review in this section is summarized as follows: (1) studies on executive-legislative relations of comparative politics do not give us light on how legislators balance and check the power of the president especially with cases of presidential impeachment. (2) The executive-legislative relations studies on the Philippine case focus on a structural level such as institutional and political opportunity structure rather than the micro-level (i.e. behavior of legislators). (3) It is not clear whether or not factors given by studies on presidential
impeachment in developed democracies can be applied to the studies in developing countries. Furthermore, a study on presidential impeachment in new democracies focuses on why impeachment cases are passed rather than scrutinizing choice of legislators in presidential impeachment. (4) There is a study on legislative voting behavior in developing democracies, yet the causal mechanism should be further explored for analyzing presidential impeachment cases.

Previous studies on executive-legislative relations do not fully provide how legislators respond to the presidential crisis. Rather, those seek how presidents build the relations with multiparty system parliament (Railey et al. 2011) or how coalition formation takes place in a variety form of the government (Shugart 2005: 19). In other words, the former is on the presidential strategies on how executive control over the parliament and the latter executive-legislative relations varies in terms of the power of the president. None of them is about the power of the parliament in presidentialism. Even in a study of the presidential impeachment, it analyzes reaction and strategy of the president to cope with the presidential impeachment (Hinojosa and Perez-Linan 2006/2007). This paper provides a framework for how legislators check and balance the executive in terms of presidential impeachment.

In terms of studies on legislative-executive relations in the Philippines, Kim (2016: 37) argues that political opportunity structure in the Philippines is not familiar with democratic consolidation, in that ‘people power’ which achieved democratic transition does not possess power on the consolidation. Some of the activists on democratization under the dictatorship of Marcos became a part of
traditional politicians and others became oppositions outside the political institution. Furthermore, Choi (2001) finds the causation between presidentialism and weak party systems after 1986 amendment of the Constitution and Ruland (2003) also suggests the electoral reform during his review on the constitutional debate in the Philippines. Ruland argues that Choi ignores the historical background of the Marcos era (Ruland 2003: 467), but also contends various reforms on how the Philippine society can be more inclusive.

As Kim suggests as future research at his paper, process or behavior of actors within the political system should be further explored (Kim 2016: 38). Three studies above deal with the systemic or structural level of analysis. This paper takes the position of a complement for those studies and, hence, focuses on the behavior of legislators, the micro level.

Previous studies on legislators’ decision on impeachment voting in the parliament argue that electoral factors such as incumbent marginality and district-level presidential popularity affect the outcome (Lanoue and Emmert 1999). Furthermore, Rothenberg and Sanders (2000) insist that continuing Republican legislators are likely to shirk to vote for the impeachment voting whereas those who leave their office might vote against the president. On the other hand, Lawrence (2007) rejects the argument of Rothenberg and Sanders with an empirical study on the same theme and persists that such shirking is not widespread and merely a peculiar activity of a certain legislator. Lawrence’s conclusion is that “[o]ther representatives’ vote on impeachment were motivated by a combination of constituency affinity for the president and member ideology” (Lawrence 2007: 161).
However, studies above assume that legislators’ ultimate goal is for their reelection. It is controversial whether this assumption is applicable to cases of new democracies under the pork-dominant system. This paper, hence, assigns this assumption as one of the rival hypotheses so as to verify the applicability of it to cases of presidential impeachment in the Philippines.

There is a study on presidential impeachment in new democracies by Young Hun Kim(2014) which gives why various impeachment cases were passed in the parliament. He provides four factors such as mobilize deputies against the president, presidential involvement in political scandal, strong presidential power, an a civil society (Kim 2014: 521-524). Yet, he does not give us an explanation on how legislators decide when presidential impeachment is in process. I provide determinants on legislators’ decision toward presidential impeachment rather than on why impeachment cases are passed.

With the case of the Philippines, a study by Kasuya(2005) conducted a study on the impeachment case of Joseph “Erap” Estrada. She argues that MPs vote for the future prospect of patronage. She focuses on why MPs of the presidential party shifted their position in the impeachment voting of the president Estrada in 2001. MPs at the time shifted their position because their patronage network was guaranteed even after the impeachment of Estrada. The vice president at the time was Gloria Arroyo from the opposition party; hence they switched their voting. However, the situation of presidential impeachment of Gloria Arroyo in 2005 and 2006 is different from that of in 2001. No politician but Arroyo can provide the pork and patronage network to legislators in 2005 and 2006. Therefore, this
model does not fully provide an explanation for why MPs of both governing and opposition parties vote to impeach the president.

Finally, there is a study on legislative voting behavior in new democracies. Shin argues that legislators mostly pass a bill unanimous or near-unanimous vote, yet voting differs upon party affiliation of legislators. Governing-party legislators are likely to vote in favor of the president, whereas oppositions are divided into two groups. Oppositions from less-developed regions are less likely to be against the president due to their demand for particularistic goods, yet those from more-developed regions are likely to oppose the president if a demand of constituencies is different from the president’s policy. Constituencies from the more-developed region demand programmed policies rather than pork and patronage (Shin 2018). Findings of Shin give us an insight how we can analyze the legislative voting behavior in new democracies under the pork-dominant system. This paper would like to generate hypotheses to test whether the argument of Shin is applicable to the cases of presidential impeachment, as well.

In sum, existing studies on executive-legislative relations do not give an explanation of how legislators behave to balance and check the power of the president. Rather, there are studies focusing on strategies of presidents dealing with the presidential impeachment. There are studies on legislative voting behavior on presidential impeachment in developed democracies, yet it is unclear whether or not factors that scholars present are applicable to cases of the developing countries. Furthermore, studies of presidential impeachment in new democracies do not give us a path on why some legislators continuously file impeachment trials in some cases and
what determinants affecting legislators’ choice are in impeachment voting. Therefore, this paper would like to present hypotheses that can explain the legislators voting behavior on presidential impeachment in new democracies through the case of the Philippines.

III. Overview: Presidential Impeachment Cases in the Philippines

Legislators of the Philippines present sufficient causes of their action when filing presidential impeachment. Yet, the outcomes of each presidential impeachment become different according to the political background of former presidents. For instance, Joseph Estrada was not a politician who was supported by local politicians, unlike Arroyo. He was elected as the president with popular support. Mass support for Estrada was a desire for transformation of Philippine politics with rampant corruption and patronage (Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003: 280). Even though he was confident that he would beat the impeachment trials in the Senate (New York Times 2000/11/14), but he left Malacanang Palace eventually. On the other hand, Arroyo defended three times of impeachment cases with her concrete political background.

If the president possesses strong political support from local politicians, then he or she would survive presidential impeachment cases easily. Otherwise, the president is impeached like Estrada’s case. It literally means that there is no means for legislators to impeach the president like Gloria Arroyo. Nevertheless, opposition
legislators consistently file presidential impeachment and the president defend herself in the parliament.

The main reason for the impeachment case of Joseph Estrada was corruption since the jueteng-gate, which is an illegal game in the Philippines, around October 2000 (Labrador 2002: 142). He was “accused of siphoning off tobacco taxes and accepting millions of dollars in payments from illegal-gambling operators” (New York Times 2000/11/14). The House of Representatives delivered the impeachment of the president for “alleged bribery, corruption, betrayal of public trust and violation of the Constitution” (Philstar 2000/11/14).

Presidential impeachment cases raised during Arroyo’s presidency were caused by the “Hello Garci” scandal which is about electoral fraud in the 2004 presidential election. On June 6, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye reveals two recordings of the telephone conversation between President Gloria Arroyo and Election Commissioner Garcillano (GMA News Online 2008/01/25). It was suspected that Arroyo manipulated election results. This scandal made some legislators to initiate the impeachment trial. Atty. Oliver Lorenzo and Atty. Jose Lopez filed the impeachment complaints with following reasons: (1) betrayal of public trust, (2) cheating in the presidential elections, (3) “Hello Garci” tape is evidence of election fraud, (4) violations of the constitution (GMA News Online 2007/11/05).

The 2006 impeachment complaint by House of Representatives states causes of action as follows: (1) culpable violation of the constitution and graft and corruption, and betrayed the public trust,
(2) violations on human rights, (3) graft, corruption, and illegal government contracts (PCIJ 2006: 10-22). Opposition legislators and organizations consistently argued that Arroyo committed a serious crime and electoral fraud.

It seems that causes of action of impeachment toward Gloria Arroyo are much more significant than those of Estrada. Estrada was accused of corruption, yet legislators initiated Arroyo’s case due to massive manipulation on elections. It is important to remind that a huge difference between Estrada and Arroyo is whether or not he or she is involved in political dynasties or the cacique system. Even though Estrada became the president with the landslide victory, he was vulnerable to the impeachment trial. Politicians with strong political dynasties can easily dismiss the presidential impeachment cases; hence opposition parties of the president must seek clear causes of action why they should impeach the president.

Despite such heavy challenges of oppositions with concrete causes of action, Arroyo dismissed three cases of impeachment whereas Estrada left his palace. According to the argument of Kasuya (2005), legislators should impeach Arroyo if there is a politician who can replace her for their particularistic goods. Yet, the vice president was on behalf of Arroyo. Therefore it was difficult for legislators to seek an alternative and to impeach the president. Nevertheless, there were legislators continuously file impeachment cases and vote to not dismiss the trial in the Senate.
IV. Hypotheses: Legislators’ Choice to 
Presidential Impeachment in the Philippines

Upon overview of presidential impeachment cases in the Philippines, it seems that previous studies do not fully provide the explanatory reasons some legislators consistently file the presidential impeachment even though their defeat is evident. This paper presents two rival hypotheses that possibly explain the case of the Philippines, especially of Arroyo’s. There are two possible arguments on how legislators vote to impeach the president in the Philippines.

The first is a hypothesis about accountability and the other is hypotheses on loyalty-to-presidents. Accountability is the idea that “elections serve to hold governments [or legislators] responsible for the results of their past actions” (Przeworski et al. 1999: 29). Based on this definition, accountability hypothesis argues that legislators vote to impeach the president according to the opinion of constituencies in their precincts. Legislators must save the president for their future pork-barrel. Hence, they support the bills delivered either by the government or the president. Yet, when the president is threatened by her scandals such as bribery and fraud, legislators choose whether or not to support the president to maintain her position. If such scandal is too severe that it might be difficult for the president to recover, legislators should seek their own way without the president. It is important to remind that legislators seek reelection in the future (Mayhew 1974).

Legislators fully recognize the importance of constituencies and supporting the president at the same time. Even though legislators in
the Philippines can be elected through electoral fraud or by providing pork and patronage to voters and a certain family in a region possesses constant incumbency advantage (Querubin 2012), it is difficult for them to be elected in a region without voting from their constituencies especially when the education rate of constituencies beyond the high school level gets higher. As Cesi Cruz demonstrates, 
“[those who are living barangays near universities] the people there are wealthier, more educated, and can’t be bought” (Cruz 2019: 391).

Hence, legislators in new democracies are elected through giving patronage to voters in less developed regions, whereas legislators in a more developed region take different tactics to make demands of constituencies tangible for their future chance of reelection.

Constituencies received higher education possess political knowledge such as “cognitive ability, civic skills, and civic orientations” (Kam and Palmer 2008: 613) which enables them to decide whether or not to impeach the president. Furthermore, those with higher education are more likely to demand a political system with transparency (Olken 2009: 958). Political participation in the Philippines is limited in that most of the elections are ruined with pork and patronage given to people who are underprivileged (Choi 2001: 492) and family members from political dynasties in local politics take incumbent advantage for their next election (Querubin 2012). It is important to remind that those educated and wealthy are less likely to be politicians if they are not involved in family members of political dynasties. Therefore most of the constituencies with higher education who are not involved in political dynasties are likely to be sensitive to the corruption of politicians for their political
participation. When finding that politicians, especially the president is corrupted and confronting presidential impeachment, they are more likely to urge their legislators to impeach the president.

Opposition party legislators have enough reasons why they should impeach the president when the president confronts scandals which might threaten her power. How about governing-party legislators? If there are alternative politicians who can be the president and she provides pork-barrel for them, they would vote to impeach the president(Kasuya 2005). Otherwise, legislators of the presidential party must protect the president for their future patronage. Yet, governing-party legislators from more-developed region must recognize constituencies’ demand at the same time. They will lose their chance for reelection in the future in that constituencies might not vote for the legislature supporting the president.

According to the background above, a hypothesis that this paper would like to raise is as below;

**Hypothesis 1:** Legislators from a district where education rate of constituencies over high school level is high are likely to vote to impeach the president in regardless of their party affiliation.

Hypotheses on royalty to the president argue that governing-party legislators vote to not impeach the president to protect their pork and patronage. The president in new democracies possesses huge power to control over the pork-barrel including appointing ministers(Arriola 2009) and funds on legislating activities(Kim 2006). Hence, it is difficult for legislators to take a position against the president in that
they might lose their pork and patronage.

Voting behavior of opposition legislators, on the other hand, is upon regions where they are from. As Shin(2018) argues, legislators from the less-developed region are likely to be with the president for their particularistic goods, whereas those from more-developed regions where people are well-off and well-educated are less likely to vote along with the president. If constituencies’ demand is different from the policy of the president, then legislators should seek an alternative way to provide the policies that constituencies desire. Hypotheses on this argument are as below;

Hypothesis 2A: legislators of the presidential party are less likely to impeach the president.
Hypothesis 2B: Opposition legislators are likely to vote to impeach the president if the education rate of constituencies becomes high.

V. Data, Variables, Measurement

I utilize a dataset by Shin(2018) on voting results of the House of Representatives in the Philippines from 8th to 13th. Two bills in the 13th were passed to dismiss the certified complaints for the impeachment against the president Gloria Arroyo, CRep1012 in 2005 and HRES1349 in 2006. Those two bills were dealt in the parliament according to the impeachment procedure of the 13th Congress.

As a matter of fact, those votings are not for impeachment, per se. According to the impeachment procedure, if one-third of the
House members sign to file the impeachment trial in the Senate, the Senate initiate the trial without voting in the House. Furthermore, the House can dismiss the impeachment case with the vote of one-third of legislators (Republic of the Philippines House of Representatives 2005). This paper utilizes two cases for dismissing the impeachment trial. For the convenience, I regard a ‘yay’ vote of legislators to dismiss the impeachment as disagreement to the impeachment, and a ‘nay’ vote as an agreement to the impeachment.

To explore the legislative voting behavior in presidential impeachment of the Philippines, I create \( IMPEACHMENT VOTING \) to measure whether or not a legislator \( i \) vote to impeach the president in a bill \( j \). A Dependent variable, \( IMPEACHMENT VOTING \), is a dummy variable which are outcomes of two bills. If a member agrees to pass the bill to dismiss the impeachment, it is coded as 0 otherwise 1. The former, 0, stands for disagreement to the presidential impeachment, the latter, 1, is for agreement. Cases of absent are eliminated in that it is difficult to recognize such absence as consent or a discontent. A total number of cases is 410, without abstention is 363. Since the dependent variable is a dummy variable, I use probit regression analysis model:

\[
IMPEACHMENT VOTING_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * EDUCATION_{ij} + \beta_2 * GOV_{ij} + \beta_3 * EDUCATION*GOV_{ij} + \beta_4 * Controls + \epsilon_{ij}
\]

1. Independent Variables

\( EDUCATION \) represents the proportion of legislator \( i \)’s constituents
who received tertiary education beyond high school, including college, university, and vocational schools. District-level census data are used. It is used as “a proxy for constituent demands, because less-educated voters tend to be poor and thus prefer pork and patronage over public policies, whereas the well-educated tend to be well-off and to prefer policy over pork” (Shin 2015; 2018: 345). Furthermore, I use this proxy for presenting that constituencies with higher education possess sufficient political knowledge to decide whether or not the president should be impeached or not. I expect the higher the education rate becomes, the more likely legislators vote for impeachment of the president.

$GOV$ refers to a dummy variable that demonstrates members of presidential party with 1, otherwise 0. According to the hypothesis 2A, governing-party legislators are likely to not vote to impeach the president for their pork and patronage network. I expect the negative slope of coefficient in empirical results of this variable. I also include the interaction term between $GOV$ and $EDUCATION$ ($EDUCATION \times GOV$) to observe whether or not effect of education rate differs according to the party affiliation of legislators.

2. Controls

$Term\text{limit}$ might affect outcome of this paper in that politicians in the Philippines cannot run for the election more than third term. In the Philippines, politicians can consecutively be elected in a district for three times. Family members of political dynasty in the district are more likely to occupy the seat in that such members take incumbency
advantage (Querubin 2012). To maintain such advantage, political dynasty is less likely to take a position against the president for their pork and patronage network vis-a-vis reelection. I expect that TermLimit possesses negative slope of coefficient.

*Dynasty* is created to measure “the strength of the support base of local legislator by counting the number of terms for which family members of legislator have served in the same province since the first Congress in 1946” (Shin 2018: 348). If a political dynasty in a certain region has taken seats in a province for long time, the dynasty is likely to vote to impeach the president because it already has a good reputation from its constituencies. I expect that Dynasty demonstrates positive slope of coefficient.

*Cterm87* refers how many times the political dynasty in the region has obtained seats since 1986 of democratization. It is a similar variable of Dynasty, yet there might be a newly-established political dynasties after democratization. Therefore, I use this variable as one of controls as well. I expect that this variable shows positive slope of coefficient.

*RESULTBYCONGRESS* refers to the vote share of the president Gloria Arroyo at the presidential election in 2004, which is announced by the government of the Republic of the Philippines. If the number of constituencies who voted Arroyo is high, then the legislature from the region should not vote to impeach her. I also include a tally on the results of election announced by National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) as a variable, *RESULTBYNAMFREL*, which argues that outcome announced by the congress is manipulated. Data of two controls are obtained from NAMFREL and collected according to the provincial level (Verzola 2004). To control for unobservable factors specific to the
year 2005, I add a year dummy; Year2005.

VI. Empirical Results

1. Main Findings

<Table 2> presents empirical results of this paper. Each model contains the effect of independent variables, when all else is equal. Model 1 shows that rate of constituencies received high education has an impact on impeachment voting. It demonstrates positive slope. As a matter of fact, effect of the rate on impeachment is consistent in every 5 models. Coefficient becomes about 3 times higher if interaction term between the rate and party affiliation of legislators is included as it is demonstrated in the model 4 and 5.

On the other hand, the impact of party affiliation of legislators is inconsistent. Even though it is statistically significant in model 1, 2, and 3, the significance disappears if the interaction term EDUCATION*GOV is included in the model 4 and 5. It means that the party affiliation has little influence on impeachment voting and the voting does not become different upon the party affiliation of legislators.

I also create model 5 to observe when the result of NAMFREL tally is included in the model. Nevertheless, the rate of constituencies received higher education demonstrates statistical significance, still. As it is seen through models, vote share that Gloria Arroyo obtained has a little effect on impeachment voting with negative slope of coefficient. If there are vote share of Arroyo in a region becomes high, it is less likely that
legislators in a province vote to impeach her.

I compute the Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) and plot it in <Graph 1>. The graph demonstrates the magnitude of marginal effects of each variables. AMEs are also called instantaneous rate of change which is upon values of other variables and its coefficient(Williams 2018). Y axis is for probability of dependent variable, impeachment voting, and X axis is for impact of each independent variables. It is observed that

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(DV: IMPEACHMENT VOTING)</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.39 -</td>
<td>-0.35 -</td>
<td>-1.05 -</td>
<td>-1.71 -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log-likelihood</td>
<td>-141.24</td>
<td>-135.38</td>
<td>-132.96</td>
<td>-132.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>363</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; - p < 0.01, - p < 0.05, - p < 0.1 in bold
*EDUCATION* possesses its impact above 0 within 95% of confidence interval, whereas *GOV* does not show its influence on impeachment voting.

2. An Additional Test: Education and Election Result

I conduct an additional probit regression analysis to check whether the rate of constituencies with higher education affect the electoral outcome of legislators. If such constituencies vote mostly to either governing-party or oppositions, empirical results presented in this paper are not robust. Because if well-off, and well-educated tend to vote the opposition legislators rather than governing-party members, opposition legislators
would be those who must take care of wealthy and highly educated constituencies whereas presidential-party legislators can easily ignore them for their future reelection. Table 3 demonstrates the outcome of the following probit model:

\[
\text{Election Results}_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times \text{EDUCATION}_{ij} + \beta_2 \times \text{Controls} + \varepsilon_{ij}
\]

I create a variable, \textit{Election Results}, to capture the election result of legislature \(i\) in province \(j\). Since there is the equivalent number of districts as the number of legislators, which means that the number of independent variables soars over the number of the dependent variable, I rather control which province legislators are from. A variable, \textit{Election Results}, is coded with a same method of measuring \textit{GOV} in the previous model.

I assign \textit{EDUCATION} as a proxy for constituencies demand. Constituencies who are well-off and well-educated are likely to vote to opposition parties in that they are more sensitive to corruption than less-educated and underprevileged are (Olken 2009: 958). Constituencies with higher education are likely to choose opposition politicians for their representatives to improve the level of transparency on political participation and so forth. If this expectation becomes true in the empirical result of Table 3, results for hypothesis A are not robust. I contain \textit{RESULTBYCONGRESS}, \textit{Termlimit}, \textit{Cterm87}, \textit{Dynasty}, regional dummies of the provincial level as controls.

According to the model of Table 3, \textit{EDUCATION} lacks statistical significance. In other words, demand of constituencies is not related to the legislators’ reelection; hence it means that constituencies vote to legislator elections not according to their education level. It is groundless
that either governing-party legislators or oppositions should take care more about constituencies with higher education. Both legislators of presidential party and oppositions should be aware of such constituencies’ demand equivalently.

**Table 3** Determinants on Election of legislators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables (DV: Election Results)</th>
<th>Coeffi.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
<td>0.48 (1.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESULTBYCONGRESS</td>
<td>0.02 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TermLimit</td>
<td>-0.09 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cterm87</td>
<td>0.39 (0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynasty</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-131.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; – p<0.01, - p<0.05, . p<0.1 in bold. The model contains region dummies excluded in this table due to its length.*

VII. Discussions

The hypothesis 1 of this paper presents that the education level of constituencies has an impact on legislators’ impeachment voting in regardless of party affiliation of legislators, whereas hypotheses 2A and 2B are about differentiated impact of the education level on legislators according to their party affiliation. Empirical results in **Table 2** demonstrate that hypothesis 2A and 2B are rejected because GOV,
whether or not legislators are from governing-party, and interaction term between \textit{GOV} and \textit{EDUCATION} lack statistical significance in model 4 and 5.

Furthermore, the additional probit regression model shows that education level of constituencies does not affect the electoral outcome of legislators. It does not show any tendency that well-off and well-educated tend to vote either to the governing-party or oppositions. If the tendency that well-off and well-educated voters are inclined to vote opposition legislators exists, then only opposition legislators might take care of constituents received higher education. Yet, the rate of education level lacks statistical significance; hence, both the governing-party and opposition legislators should look after constituents with higher education for their reelection.

Yet, this paper does not demonstrate whether or not voter demands eventually shift due to the impeachment voting. A limitation of this paper is that it does not show an evidence that accountability actually works after the voting. This paper suggests future research on how the accountability in the Philippine parliament does work in detail. Nevertheless, this paper provides how voter demands affect legislators’ choice in the impeachment voting.

To address issues how this paper is dealing with arguments of previous studies, I provide two points: first, studies on presidential impeachment with the American case demonstrate that presidential popularity in a district level (Lanoue and Emmert 1999) affect the legislators’ impeachment voting and legislators who leave office are likely to vote to impeach the president (Rothenberg and Sanders 2000). To take those variables into account and observe whether arguments are applicable to
cases of new democracies, I include variables such as TermLimit, Cterm87, Dynasty, and election results which illustrate characteristics of legislators from precincts.

Second, I control variables above and then present two rival hypotheses. The first hypothesis follows to the traditional notion on accountability of legislators and the second two hypotheses are established upon findings of Shin(2018) on legislative voting behavior in new democracies. I show that findings of this paper correspond to the first debate on accountability. It means that voter demands affect the legislative voting behavior of presidential impeachment in the Philippines. This finding can be a challenge to previous studies on the Filipino politics arguing that public opinion and legislators are difficult to check and balance power of the president. For instance, a study of structural level of analysis such as Kim(2016) argues that quality of democracy in the Philippines is low and political institutions are not friendly with political participation of citizens. Yet, this paper shows a different aspect with this micro-level study that political participation of educated constituencies are likely to be reflected to decisions of legislators.

This paper, however, does not show how voting behavior of constituencies shifts or how their preferences over the political system change after the impeachment voting. Furthermore, the additional test in <Table 3> does not demonstrate whether or not constituents with higher education are more likely to be involved in political participation. It shows a tendency that well-off and well-educated are tend to vote either to governing or opposition parties does not exist. An impact of education on political participation in the Philippines can be explored further by
showing that there is a retrospective voting after legislative voting on presidential impeachment. I suggest a future study to address this issue.

VIII. Conclusion

This study provides a response to following questions: why some of Filipino legislators continuously file the presidential impeachment even though their defeat is evident? Do legislators vote the impeachment case according to the loyalty to the president, or accountability vis-a-vis constituencies? I present findings that the voter demands affect the impeachment voting of legislators. These findings correspond to a traditional idea and discussion of accountability that legislators are “responsible for the results of their past actions” (Przeworski et al. 1999: 29).

Furthermore, this paper takes a position as a complement of a study on presidential impeachment of Estrada by Kasuya (2005). Joseph Estrada was impeached due to his vulnerable political background and the presence of an alternative leadership for legislators’ pork and patronage, whereas cases of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in this paper demonstrate that the strong political background of the president fortifies power of the president. This argument can be further explored by scrutinizing other cases of presidents in new democracies under the pork-dominant system.

This paper, in addition, explains how legislators behave to check and balance the president with institutional means, the presidential impeachment, in the Philippines. It is, however, difficult to generalize how legislators actually check and balance in new democracies with this
single case. This study can be further developed with cases of other new democracies and a case of the impeachment trial toward the current president Rodrigo Duterte as well.

This paper suggests an additional future research question. What do wealthier and well-educated do for their political participation in new democracies under pork-dominant system? What are their preferences over political institutions and policies? According to studies on developed democracies such as the United States, well-off and well-educated voters especially with over highschool level are likely to withdraw their support to the Democratic Party and become conservative in some issues, such as the economic policies (Marshall 2019). There is a study on the emergence of the middle class on democratization of the Philippines (Kimura 2003), yet the study does not show whether or not such the middle class can challenge the current existing political institutions. It is important to recognize whether or not the middle class exists in the Philippines for enhancing the quality of democracy.
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신생 민주주의 국가 국회의원의 대통령 탄핵안 투표 성향 분석: 필리핀 하원의 사례 연구

이 정 우
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필리핀의 대통령은 선심과 국회의원의 의정 활동 자원에 대한 승인권을 쥐고 있어 그 권력이 막강하다. 사실상 국회의원들은 대통령이 원하는 법안마다 만장일치로 통과하게 할 수밖에 없다. 그러나 국회에서는 패배가 너무도 분명한데도 탄핵 시도가 빈번히 일어난다. 국회의원들은 대통령의 정치적 위기에 직면할 때마다 무엇을 기준으로 탄핵 투표에 임하는가? 유권자들에 대한 책임성(Accountability)을 중요하게 생각하는가 아니면 대통령에 대한 충성을 조금 더 중요하게 생각하는가? 이러한 문제 제기를 바탕으로 본 논문에서는 글로리아 아로요 대통령의 탄핵에 대한 필리핀 하원 의원들의 투표 성향을 분석하였다.

본 논문은 우선 기존의 연구에 따라 두 가지의 가설을 제시하였다. (1) 책임성을 중시하여 여당과 야당에 상관없이 유권자들의 요구에 따라서 탄핵 투표에 임한다. (2) 대통령에 대한 충성을 중시하여 여당과 야당이 각각 다르게 반응할 것이며, 야당도 유권자의 수준과 요구에 따라서 반응이 달라질 것이다. 본 논문에서 유권자들의 요구는 교육 수준에 따라서 달라진다고 보았다. 왜냐면 교육 수준이 높은 유권자일수록 탄핵 투표가 어떠한 이유에서 통과하여야 하는가에
대한 정치적 지식의 수준이 높을 것이기 때문이다. 두 대립가설의 타당성을 검증하기 위하여 본 논문은 프로빗 회귀 분석 모델을 수행한다. 그 결과 (1)번의 가설을 채택하여 여당과 야당에 상관없이 유권자들의 교육 수준의 영향에 따라 하원 의원들은 대통령 탄핵 투표에 임하는 것을 확인하였다.

주제어: 대통령 탄핵, 선심 정치, 유권자의 요구, 의정 활동, 책무성, 필리핀